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Abstract
A number of researchers today make an appeal to quantum
physics when trying to develop a satisfactory account of the mind,
an appeal still felt to be controversial by many. Often these “quan-
tum approaches” try to explain some well-known features of con-
scious experience (or mental processes more generally), thus using
quantum physics to enrich the explanatory framework or explanans
used in consciousness studies and cognitive science. This paper
considers the less studied question of whether quantum physical
intuitions could help us to draw attention to new or neglected as-
pects of the mind in introspection, and in this way change our view
about what needs explanation in the first place. Although prima
facie implausible, it is suggested that this could happen, for exam-
ple, if there were analogies between quantum processes and mental
processes (e.g., the process of thinking). The naive idea is that
such analogies would help us to see mental processes and conscious
experience in a new way.
It has indeed been proposed long ago that such analogies exist,
and this paper first focuses at some length on David Bohm’s formu-
lation of them from 1951. It then briefly considers these analogies
in relation to Smolensky’s more recent analogies between cognitive
science and physics, and Pylkko¨’s aconceptual view of the mind.
Finally, Bohm’s early analogies will be briefly considered in rela-
tion to the analogies between quantum processes and the mind he
proposed in his later work.
1. Introduction
There are by now many approaches that seek to explain conscious ex-
perience, and mental processes more generally, in terms of a conceptual
framework involving ideas from quantum physics (see e.g. Atmanspacher
2011 and the references therein). In this paper I will explore another, less
studied possibility, namely that quantum physics might not only help us
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to explain commonly acknowledged features of the mind, but also to draw
attention to neglected but important aspects of our inner experience. In
other words, I am interested in the question of whether the consideration
of quantum physics can change our view of what there is to be explained
about the mind in the first place (the explanandum), over and above the
more obvious role it might play as affecting the explanans, i.e. the concep-
tual framework with which we try to explain some well-known features of
conscious experience and mental processes (cf. van Gulick 1995).
Insofar as a quantum physical framework is an explanans that helps us
to see mind/consciousness as the explanandum in the new way, we could
say that “explanandum is explanans -laden”. Van Gulick (1995) does not
consider this possibility in his interesting paper “What would count as
explaining consciousness?”, although he makes otherwise a very useful
attempt to “divide and conquer” the problem of consciousness. But if
we want to acknowledge at the outset any possible bias in our attempts
to explain conscious experience and mental processes, then we ought to
consider not only how our explanans deals with the explanandum, but also
the more difficult issue of whether the explanans we always already have
affects the way we perceive and define the explanandum in the first place.1
In consciousness studies, introspection plays a central role as a method.
But when studying conscious experience in introspection, how much is
what we “see” affected by the scientific theory and, more generally, the
worldview or paradigm we happen to hold? To what extent is introspec-
tion theory- or paradigm-laden?
To unpack the idea of a “paradigm-ladeness of introspection”, the
first point to note is that in the philosophy of science it is a household
fact that “observation is theory-laden”, that what we observe in general,
and also in our scientific experiments, is affected by the theory we are
using, and other assumptions, and our (more or less unconsciously held)
Weltanschauung or paradigm (see e.g. Hanson (1958), Kuhn (1962/1970),
and Feyerabend (1975/1993); see also Suppe (1977)). A nice summary
1In both analytical and (especially) continental philosophy since the middle of the
last century it has been one of leading paradigms to think that “... our experiential
access to reality is essentially mediated by the historical contexts of meaning – lan-
guages, concepts, norms – in which we live, and which determine in advance what we
may see and identify as meaningful phenomena” (Westerlund 2014, p. 2). At the end
of his recent extensive study of Heidegger’s account of the problem of phenomenality,
Westerlund (2014, p. 506) makes some proposals that are very relevant to our present
concerns: “We always already live in historically transmitted and collectively sanc-
tioned concepts and meanings which tend to guide our sight and which invite us to
attend only to what our pre-understanding commands.” Indeed. The basic idea of the
present paper is that the prevailing mechanistic spirit that has been much strength-
ened by classical physics tends to lead us to ignore important aspects of our experience
(cf. the criticism of the dominant role of the “containment metaphor” and its ac-
companying ontology of little things and “microbangings” in contemporary analytical
metaphysics by Ladyman and Ross (2007)).
Quantum Analogies for the Process of Thought 63
of the Feyerabend-Kuhn view of theory-ladeness is given by Suppe (1977,
p. 689):
[Shapere] finds that the Feyerabend-Kuhn view makes the following
chain of inferences:
(i) Observation, if it is to be relevant, must be interpreted.
(ii) That in terms of which interpretation is made is always theory.
(iii) The theory that interprets is the theory to be tested.
(iv) The theory to be tested is “the whole of science” (or a branch
thereof).
(v) This whole forms a unity (“paradigm” or “high-level back-
ground theory”).
(vi) This unified whole not only serves as a basis of interpretation,
but also determines (“defines”) what counts as an observation,
problem, method, solution, and so forth.
For the purposes of this paper the question is whether it makes a difference
to consciousness studies (and introspection in particular) that “the whole
of science” includes quantum physics. In other words, can the radically
different “whole of science” we get as a result of quantum physics affect the
way we interpret our observations in introspection? Can it affect it so that
we can obtain in some ways a more complete and accurate explanation of
conscious experience and mental processes?
Note that the Feyerabend-Kuhn approach raises the issues of relativism
and circularity in a powerful way. If the theory we are allegedly testing
is also the one we use to interpret the results, and the one which defines
what counts as observation, problem, method and solution, how objective,
neutral and impartial can such testing be judged to be? There is a risk of
a deep circularity that arises if we take seriously the idea that observation
– including introspection – is theory-laden.
In this paper, however, I will not try to tackle the difficulties raised
by circularity and relativism. For the sake of the argument, I will assume
that there is a sense in which a given theory might give us a more complete
and more accurate description and explanation of a given phenomenon or
domain than some other theory. And thus, I assume that it is at least
in principle possible that, for example, a scientific worldview taking into
account the results of new quantum physics could help us to describe and
explain the mind in a better way than the common-sense worldview of
classical physics. Let us now proceed to explore in more detail how this
might be possible.
It seems fairly obvious that people who are familiar with quantum
physics develop a whole new set of intuitions about, for example, what it
can mean for a phenomenon to be physical, or about general principles
that prevail in phenomena. The possibility to be explored here then is
that, when studying conscious experience in introspection, these people
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might well make use of these new intuitions and see new aspects of the
mind, or give importance to aspects that others in a sense see but tend
to neglect.
If introspection is theory-laden, then people who hold the classical,
mechanistic worldview as the only relevant truth might well tend to see
and emphasize only the classical and mechanistic aspects of conscious ex-
perience and mental processes, while people equipped with classical as well
as quantum intuitions might see broader aspects. The “classical and mech-
anistic” aspects I have in mind are separable objects in experience, causal
relations between them, the idea that (more or less) Euclidian-Newtonian
spacetime is the arena where conscious experience takes place. In the do-
main of thought and language, some cognitive scientists emphasize that
thinking is essentially mechanical symbol manipulation. Presumably they
find such characterization introspectively accurate.
I do not claim that when we ordinarily and pre-theoretically introspect
we would automatically find only such mechanistic features. Rather, the
idea is that much of, say, contemporary philosophy of mind and cogni-
tive (neuro)science involves strongly mechanistic assumptions that direct
us to draw attention to the mechanistic aspects of the mind, while mak-
ing it more difficult to see other aspects. When you have a hammer in
your hand, everything in the world looks like a nail. Analogously, to an
introspector equipped with the mechanistic conceptual tools of modern
cognitive science and philosophy of mind, conscious experience and men-
tal processes may well look more mechanistic than to someone with a
different, less mechanistic paradigm. This does not, of course, mean that
the mind has no mechanistic aspects. But it should make us more open
to the possibility that the mind has also other kinds of aspects that might
be better appreciated in the light of a different theory.
The above, if correct, suggests an interesting way in which quantum
approaches to consciousness and mental processes can be relevant. They
might draw attention to important aspects of the mind that tend to be
neglected (or simply “not seen”) by the prevalent more mechanistic ap-
proaches to the mind. This may sound prima facie quite implausible.
How on earth could quantum physics, which deals with atomic phenom-
ena, help us to more accurately introspect conscious experience and men-
tal processes, which appear to be completely different phenomena at a
different, perhaps neurobiological level of organization (as, e.g., Revonsuo
(2006) assumes)?
One way in which this could be imagined is in terms of analogies be-
tween quantum phenomena and mental phenomena.2 Suppose, for the
2For an interesting paper discussing analogies between modern physics and cogni-
tive psychology, see Shanon (1991). For a defense of the role of analogy in scientific
reasoning, see Campbell (1957) and Hesse (1966, 1974); see also Pickering (1984) and
Cushing (1990), all quoted in Guarini (2003).
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sake of the argument, that quantum phenomena and some features of our
inner experiences resemble each other in some important respects. For
example, let us assume that the way conscious thought typically “pro-
ceeds”, or changes its state from moment to moment, would resemble
the way a quantum system typically moves. Then suppose that someone
familiar with quantum processes would begin to systematically consider
the nature of their inner experience and thought processes. Seeing re-
semblances between the two domains might well constitute a non-trivial,
exciting discovery.
Now, it so happens that many physicists have in fact proposed that
there are strong resemblances between quantum processes and our inner
experiences and thought processes. Such analogies were proposed to exist
early on by the founding figures of quantum theory, for example by Niels
Bohr (1934). In contemporary research similar analogies still play an im-
portant role. Consider, for example, Globus’ (2003) interesting suggestion
that Vitiello’s dual-mode quantum brain dynamics resembles Heidegger’s
dynamical Ereignis whose modes are “being” and “time”.
In this paper I will focus upon a fairly detailed early discussion of
analogies between quantum and thought processes put forward by the
physicist-philosopher David Bohm (1951). Interestingly in view of the
questions we started off with, Bohm’s analogies seem to draw attention
to certain aspects of the mind that, although at least potentially funda-
mental and important when noticed and considered, nevertheless tend to
be neglected in many contemporary academic studies of the mind.
In this paper my aim is thus, via considering Bohm’s analogies, to
explore whether quantum intuitions can help us to understand conscious
experience and mental processes in a new and better way – better in the
sense that such quantum intuitions would draw attention to and help to
explain certain important but neglected characteristics of the mind. In
order to realize that aim I will first describe and discuss at some length
Bohm’s analogies between quantum processes and thought processes; I
will then consider these in relation to Smolensky’s (1988) analogies be-
tween physics and cognitive science; I next interpret Bohm’s analogies in
terms of Pylkko¨’s (1998) aconceptual view of the mind; and in my con-
cluding reflections I briefly consider some of Bohm’s later interpretations
of quantum theory and the way he used them to develop new analogies
to understand the mind.
2. Analogies Between Quantum Processes
and Thought Processes
Already the founding figures of quantum theory, and Niels Bohr in
particular, drew attention to the possible relevance of quantum physics
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to our understanding of the mind (see, e.g., Bohr 1934). A particularly
clear early statement about certain close resemblances between quantum
processes and thought processes, influenced by Bohr’s ideas, can also be
found in Bohm’s acclaimed 1951 textbook Quantum Theory. That book,
written when Bohm was still an advocate of the so called “orthodox” or
“Copenhagen” interpretation of quantum theory, puts a strong emphasis
on the physical meaning of quantum theory, as opposed to its mathemat-
ical formalism, which is focused at in many textbooks.3
When he wrote his 646-page book Bohm thus certainly had the more
general physical and philosophical significance of quantum physics strongly
in his mind (see especially Chap. 8, “An attempt to build a physical pic-
ture of the quantum nature of matter”, pp. 144–172). This put him into a
good position to consider “wide ranges of experience in which occur phe-
nomena possessing striking resemblances to quantum phenomena”. His
basic claim in this regard was that there is a close analogy between quan-
tum processes and our inner experiences and thought processes. After
discussing such analogies he also provided some speculations of the un-
derlying reasons for the existence of the analogies (pp. 168–172).
Let us now consider Bohm’s discussion in some detail. I have in-
cluded fairly long quotations and added explanatory comments in order
to make the paper more accessible to those without a strong background
in quantum physics. Also, I let Bohm himself speak on the physics issues
whenever this seems reasonable. A closer examination of his 1951 analo-
gies is also useful from the point of view of understanding the historical
roots of the idea that quantum physics might play an important role in
the study of the mind.
2.1 An Uncertainty Principle for the Process of Thought
Bohm (1951) starts off by considering the uncertainty principle of
quantum theory and certain aspects of our thought processes (p. 169):
If a person tries to observe what he is thinking about at the very
moment that he is reflecting on a particular subject, it is generally
agreed that he introduces unpredictable and uncontrollable changes
in the way his thoughts proceed thereafter. Why this happens is not
definitely known at present ... If we compare (1) the instantaneous
3It has turned out that while Bohm initially thought that he was presenting Bohr’s
interpretation of quantum theory, his account is actually closer to Pauli’s interpretation
(Bohm in discussion with M. Wilkins, The David Bohm Papers, Birkbeck College,
London, www.bbk.ac.uk/lib/about/bohm). This explains some of the responses to his
book that Bohm received from Bohr, Pauli and Einstein. Bohr remained silent while
Pauli sent an enthusiastic reply. According to Bohm, Einstein liked the book but
was still not happy with the usual interpretation of quantum theory and wanted to
discuss the matter with Bohm. These discussions had a key motivating role for Bohm’s
formulation of his 1952 non-local “hidden-variables” approach.
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state of a thought with the position of a particle and (2) the general
direction of change of that thought with the particle’s momentum,
we have a strong analogy.
In classical, Newtonian physics one can, in principle, measure the momen-
tum and position of a particle accurately at the same time – a special case
of that is when we look at a stationary object where momentum equals
zero and the position is where we see and measure it to be located. At the
quantum level it is not possible to measure position and momentum si-
multaneously with arbitrarily high accuracy, beyond the limits set by the
uncertainty principle. Bohm implies that in this respect thought is more
quantum-like than classical-like. Given that the uncertainty principle is
one of the most characteristic features of quantum physics (and relates to
Bohr’s principle of “complementarity”, see Plotnitsky 2010), it is at least
prima facie interesting whether or not a kind of uncertainty principle (and
thus complementarity) also applies to aspects of our thought process.
Bohm (1951, p. 169) continues:
... a person can always describe approximately what he is think-
ing about without introducing significant disturbances in his train
of thought. But as he tries to make the description precise, he
discovers that either the subject of his thoughts or their trend or
sometimes both become very different from what they were before
he tried to observe them. Thus, the actions involved in making any
single aspect of the thought process definite appear to introduce un-
predictable and uncontrollable changes in other equally significant
aspects.
This, again, is reminiscent of quantum physics. It is possible to make “un-
sharp measurements” where one obtains an approximate idea of the po-
sition of a particle, without making the momentum completely unknown.
But should one want to measure the position precisely, the momentum
becomes undefined. Thus, even if we were able to make “unsharp mea-
surements” of both the direction and content of our thought process at
a given instant, this would be analogous to measurements in quantum
physics.
2.2 Holistic Features of Thought and Quantum Processes
Bohm further develops the analogy by suggesting that the “significance
of thought processes” appears to be characterized by indivisibility (p. 169):
... if a person attempts to apply to his thinking more and more pre-
cisely defined elements, he eventually reaches a stage where further
analysis cannot even be given a meaning. Part of the significance of
each element of a thought process appears, therefore, to originate in
its indivisible and incompletely controllable connections with other
elements.
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In a footnote, he adds:
Similarly, part of the connotation of a word depends on the words
it is associated with, and in a way that is not, in practice, com-
pletely predictable or controllable (especially in speech). In fact,
the analysis of language, as actually used, into distinct elements
with precisely defined relations between them is probably impossi-
ble.
Bohm is here concerned with the nature of meaning. We may custom-
arily think that elements of our thought and language, such as sentences
or words, carry their meanings autonomously. Just as classical physics
assumes that the physical world consists of some basic elements (particles
and fields), whose “intrinsic nature” is not affected by the relationships
they enter, so we might assume that thought and language can be an-
alyzed to some basic elements which have determinate and well-defined
meanings, independently of the relations that such elements have to others
or to their surrounding context.
The idea of “elementary propositions” and “names” in Wittgenstein’s
Tractatus can perhaps be seen as an attempt to conceive language in
such a way. Wittgenstein writes (4.221 in Tractatus, quoted in Jones
(1975, p. 204)): “It is obvious that the analysis of propositions must
bring us to elementary propositions which consist of names in immediate
combination”. Jones (1975, p. 204) further describes Wittgenstein’s view
as follows: “... unless a sentence can be analyzed into a series of simple
symbols (‘primitive names’), each of which refers to a simple object that
can be ‘elucidated’ by primitive propositions, the sentence is meaningless”.
As is well known, the later Wittgenstein gave up such an atomistic
view of meaning and emphasized, for example, that to determine the
meaning of a term we ought to consider how the term is used. It is
obvious that Bohm likewise did not think that the structure of thought
and language is atomistic. Instead, he emphasized the holistic nature of
meaning. Elements of our thought process and language do not have their
meanings autonomously, but they originate in the connections with other
elements. And, Bohm suggests, these connections are both indivisible and
incompletely controllable. For him this implies that it is not possible to
analyze language beyond a certain stage and expect to find elements with
well-defined significance.
Quine, as is well known, also emphasized the holistic nature of lan-
guage. He held that we cannot define concepts and words individually,
for language is a holistic system. Quine has, following Duhem, famously
analyzed the implications of this holism for the empirical verification of
propositions (Quine 1951/1961, p. 41–43):
... our statements about the external world face the tribunal of
sense experience not individually but only as a corporate body. ...
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The idea of defining a symbol in use was ... an advance over the
impossible term-by-term empiricism of Locke and Hume. The state-
ment, rather than the term, came with Bentham to be recognized
as the unit accountable to an empiricist critique. But what I am
now urging is that even in taking the statement as unit we have
drawn our grid too finely. The unit of empirical significance is the
whole of science.
Any statement can be held true come what may, if we make drastic
enough adjustments elsewhere in the system.
These brief quotations provide some broader context for Bohm’s ideas
about the indivisibility of meaning. Interestingly, Bohm’s remarks were
published in the very same year, 1951, when Quine published his famous
article “Two Dogmas of Empiricism”, from which the above quotations are
taken. Of course, Bohm is not specifically concerned with propositional
thought or truth conditions, but more with meaning as we encounter it
with actual thought processes and actual language use. Bohm’s way of
looking at meaning and thought as psychological phenomena seems more
similar to, for example, Gestalt psychology, (see, e.g., Sundqvist 2003,
pp. 177–181) than to analytical philosophy of language which is more
concerned with logical and semantic properties of language.
It is an interesting question whether the holism of thought and lan-
guage, seen as an actual psychological phenomenon, is connected with the
holism of semantic properties of propositions (which some see as mind-
independent). This question, however, will not be pursued here. Instead,
let us go on to consider in what way Bohm thinks that there is an analogy
between the holistic features of thought/language and quantum processes
(Bohm 1951, p. 169):
Similarly, some of the characteristic properties of a quantum sys-
tem (for example, wave or particle nature) depend on indivisible
and incompletely controllable quantum connections with surround-
ing objects. Thus, thought processes and quantum systems are
analogous in that they cannot be analyzed too much in terms of
distinct elements, because the “intrinsic nature” of each element is
not a property existing separately from and independently of other
elements but is, instead, a property that arises partially from its re-
lation with other elements. In both cases, an analysis into distinct
elements is correct only if it is so approximate that no significant
alteration of the various indivisibly connected parts would result
from it.
To get a better idea of the quantum physical side of the analogy, it is
useful to consider another description of indivisible quantum connections
that Bohm gives. At the quantum level of accuracy, he says (p. 166)
... the quanta connecting object and environment constitute irre-
ducible links that belong, at all times, as much to one part as to the
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other. Since the behavior of each part depends as much on these
quanta as on its “own” properties, it is clear that no part of the
system can be thought of as separate.
If, in a classical experiment, we discovered the presence of irre-
ducible “links” between objects, we should then postulate a third
object, the link, and thus re-establish the old type of description
[analysis into parts], this time in terms of three parts to the sys-
tem. In quantum theory, however, these quanta do not constitute
separate objects, but are only a way of talking about indivisible
transitions of the objects already in existence.
Consider, for example a situation in which a hydrogen atom in the
ground state absorbs a quantum of energy from an electromagnetic field
(p. 166–167): “during the process of transition, both systems are coupled
because they are exchanging an indivisible quantum of energy belonging
as much to the electron as to the electromagnetic field.” More generally,
because strictly speaking all physical “parts” that interact with each other
are connected by such indivisible quanta to other “parts”, quantum theory
implies a fundamentally holistic view of the physical universe. Bohm
(p. 167) concludes that
the entire universe must, on a very accurate level, be regarded as
a single indivisible unit in which separate parts appear as idealiza-
tions permissible only on a classical level of accuracy of descrip-
tion. This means that the view of the world as being analogous to
a huge machine, the predominant view from the sixteenth to nine-
teenth centuries, is now shown to be only approximately correct.
The underlying structure of matter, however, is not mechanical.
Bohm thus suggests that thought processes and quantum systems have
in common a certain ontological holism, which means that they cannot be
analyzed too much in terms of distinct elements. This is so, he suggests,
because an analysis beyond a certain point changes the “intrinsic nature”
of the element in question. Elements can have certain characteristic prop-
erties (e.g., individual words have meaning; an individual electron exhibits
either a wave or a particle nature), but they have such properties partly
in virtue of the relations they have with other elements. Change those
relations, and you may profoundly change the characteristic properties.
For example, an electron that just exhibited a wave-like property may
suddenly exhibit a particle-like property, if it is made to interact with
an apparatus that measures its position. Analogously, in the spirit of
Quine’s semantic holism, a statement that previously seemed false may
suddenly seem true if we make drastic enough adjustments elsewhere in
the theoretical system it belongs to.
Bohm implies that the context-dependence of properties is no anomaly
in a quantum universe. On the contrary, the context-dependence of prop-
erties seems to be a very fundamental feature of our physical universe.
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Although the context-dependence we find with e.g. meanings of words or
statements is not necessarily the same type of context-dependence that
we find with the properties of quantum systems, I would say that the
similarities between thought/language and quantum systems in this re-
spect are at least prima facie interesting and worth further exploration
(cf. Stamenov 2004).
2.3 The Classical Limit of Quantum Theory
and the Logical Aspect of Thought Processes
Bohm next points out yet another analogy, namely that between thought
processes and the classical limit of quantum theory. Before discussing this
analogy, let us briefly consider the physics side of the issue.
When we say that quantum theory has a classical limit, we acknowl-
edge that, although at the fundamental quantum level movement seems
discontinuous, there is a domain of physical phenomena where Newton’s
continuous and deterministic laws of motion provide an approximately
correct description. Similarly, although quantum theory emphasizes the
indivisible unity of the world, it seems that in our everyday experience
we encounter a world that can, for all practical purposes, be analyzed
into distinct elements. But how to reconcile the classical and quantum
“worlds” – after all it seems that the world in which we live has both as-
pects? This question is connected with the correspondence principle that
Bohr developed, described by Bohm (1951, p. 31) as follows:
this principle states that the laws of quantum physics must be so
chosen that in the classical limit, where many quanta are involved,
the quantum laws lead to the classical equations as an average. The
problem of satisfying the correspondence principle is by no means
trivial. In fact, the requirement of satisfying the correspondence
principle, combined with indivisibility, the wave-particle duality,
and incomplete determinism ... define[s] the quantum theory in an
almost unique manner.
The discontinuous, indeterminate quantum level and the continuous, de-
terministic classical level are reconciled by noting that (p. 142)
... first, the discontinuities are too small to be seen on a classical
level and, second, that so many quantum processes take place in
any classical process that the deviation of the actual results from
the statistical average is negligible.
Yet another quotation illustrates how to reconcile the unpredictability
of an individual quantum with the causal laws on a macroscopic scale
involving many such quanta (p. 30):
As for the appearance of apparently exact causal laws on a macro-
scopic scale, when only the probability of each elementary quantum
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transfer is determined, we merely note that, where many quanta
are involved, the probability becomes almost a certainty (but not
quite). This is very similar to the exact prediction, by insurance
statistics, of the mean lifetime of a person within a large group, even
though an exact prediction of the lifetime of a single individual in
the group is not possible.
Having now a better idea of what is meant by the classical limit of the
quantum theory, let us move on to explore what Bohm means when he says
that there is “... a similarity between the thought process and the classical
limit”. His basic idea is that the “the logical process corresponds to the
most general type of thought process as the classical limit corresponds to
the most general quantum process” (pp. 169–170). This implies that the
general structure of thought is analogous to the general structure of phys-
ical reality. In physical reality, as seen via the quantum theory, there is
the level of general quantum processes with characteristic properties (in-
divisibility, wave-particle duality, uncontrollability, unpredictability etc.).
Also, there is the classical limit where analysis into distinct elements is
possible, as well as the mathematical description of the movement and in-
teraction of these elements in terms of the deterministic laws of classical
physics.
Bohm suggests that the relation between the logical process to the
most general type of thought process is analogous to the relation between
the classical limit and the most general quantum process. How does this
analogy work? Bohm (1951, p. 170) writes:
In the logical process, we deal with classifications. These classifi-
cations are conceived as being completely separate but related by
the rules of logic, which may be regarded as the analogue of the
causal laws of classical physics. In any thought process, the com-
ponent ideas are not separate but flow steadily and indivisibly. An
attempt to analyze them into separate parts destroys or changes
their meanings. Yet there are certain types of concepts, among
which are those involving the classification of objects, in which
we can, without producing any essential changes, neglect the indi-
visible and incompletely controllable connection with other ideas.
Instead, the connection can be regarded as causal and following the
rules of logic.
Bohm implies that there is a general type of thought process in which
wholeness prevails. The component ideas are not separately existing ele-
ments with well-defined meanings. These ideas do not necessarily trans-
form according to the rules of logic, but instead they “flow steadily and
indivisibly”. This general thought is a process, but not necessarily a pro-
cess having order and necessity as characteristic of logical thought.
However, just as the physical world has a classically describable do-
main, so the process of thought includes the domain of logical thought
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process. In this “classical limit of thought” the indivisibility and uncon-
trollability of ideas that typically prevail in the general thought process
have such a small effect that they can be neglected for all practical pur-
poses. This makes it possible for relatively autonomous elements, for
example concepts that classify objects, to arise. And it also makes pos-
sible for such elements to have causal relationships with each other, for
example those causal relationships required for an actual volitional think-
ing process to proceed according to the rules of logic. In this way the
“classical limit of thought”, or the emergence of separate concepts and
causal connections between them, makes logical thinking possible.
Of course, the classical limit is fundamentally important for both the
physical world as we know it and for the very thought process that tries to
have knowledge about the physical world. Bohm describes the role of the
classical limit of both thought and quantum theory as follows (p. 170):
Logically definable concepts play the same fundamental role in ab-
stract and precise thinking as do separable objects and phenomena
in our customary description of the world. Without the develop-
ment of logical thinking, we would have no clear way to express the
results of our thinking, and no way to check its validity. Thus, just
as life as we know it would be impossible if quantum theory did
not have its present classical limit, thought as we know it would be
impossible unless we could express its results in logical terms.
So it is important to note that Bohm does not deny the importance
of the “classical limit of thought”, any more than he would deny the
importance of the classical limit of quantum theory. On the contrary,
he emphasizes that logical thinking is fundamental for the enterprise of
science, and for thought in general. But his approach implies that it
would be a mistake to assume that logical thinking is the most general
essence of the thought process, just as it would be a mistake to assume
that classical physics reflects the essential nature of the physical world.
He writes (p. 170):
Yet, the basic thinking process probably cannot be described as
logical. For instance, many people have noted that a new idea often
comes suddenly, after a long and unsuccessful search and without
any apparent direct cause. We suggest that if the intermediate
indivisible nonlogical steps occurring in an actual thought process
are ignored, and if we restrict ourselves to a logical terminology,
then the production of new ideas presents a strong analogy to a
quantum jump. In a similar way, the actual concept of a quantum
jump seems necessary in our procedure of describing a quantum
system that is actually an indivisible whole in terms of words and
concepts implying that it can be analyzed into distinct parts.
Bohm thus implies that the basic thinking process is “non-logical”.
Logical thinking emerges out of such a process under certain conditions,
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analogously to the way causal physical processes emerge out of the general
quantum process at the classical limit. Interestingly, he suggests that
the production of new ideas involves quantum-like thought procesess that
essentially involve indivisible, non-logical steps. One central theme in the
philosophy of science of the last century has been the difference between
the context of discovery and the context of justification. Bohm gives a new
expression to this idea when he implies that the discovery of new ideas
may typically require a quantum-like, general, even non-logical thinking
process, while their justification has to take place in the “classical limit
of thought” and make use of the logical thinking process.
Notice also that Bohm’s above quote implies that there is yet another
feature which quantum processes and the general thought process have in
common: it is difficult to talk about either of them when using the logical
thinking process which employs well-defined concepts. He emphasizes that
the notion of “quantum jump” is an example of a notion that we have to
use in quantum physics when we try to talk about something indivisible in
terms of words and concepts implying that it can be analyzed into distinct
parts. Our customary ways of making sense of phenomena presuppose
such analyzability; and when we apply analytical tools to phenomena
that are strictly speaking unanalyzable, the result may be a somewhat
artificial and unintelligible concept, such as that of a quantum jump.
2.4 Thinking is Basically Quantum-Like
The new proposal that comes out of Bohm’s analogies is thus the
idea that our thought process has a “quantum-like” aspect, and even
more strongly, that the basic, most general type of thinking process is
quantum-like. This basic thinking process is characteristic of quantum-
like complementarity, in the sense that making one aspect of the process
definite inevitably changes other equally significant aspects. It is also
characteristic of quantum-like wholeness and relationality, in the sense
that the characteristic properties (e.g., meaning) of elements of thought
depend on indivisible connections with other elements. Further, the sug-
gestion is that the way the general thought process changes from moment
to moment is also quantum-like, for it involves non-logical steps. The
component ideas in such a process are not separate but flow steadily and
indivisibly. Finally, the basic thinking process seems to have a “classical
limit”, namely thinking in terms of well-defined concepts, including the
logical thinking process.
What are the reasons that the most general type of thinking process
is quantum-like? One possibility is that it is a mere co-incidence. But
one can also ask whether the quantum-like features of the basic think-
ing process could be an indication that the physical aspect of the basic
thinking process literally involves quantum processes. Considering this
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question, Bohm refers to Bohr’s (1934) suggestion that “... thought in-
volves such small amounts of energy that quantum-theoretical limitations
play an essential role in determining its character”. Bohm further writes
(p. 170–171):
There is no question that observations show the presence of an
enormous amount of mechanism in the brain, and that much of this
mechanism must probably be regarded as operating on a classically
describable level. In fact, nerve connections found thus far suggest
combinations of telephone exchanges and calculating machines of a
complexity that has probably never been dreamed of before.
Bohm thus acknowledges that a great deal of neural mechanisms is classi-
cally describable. But unlike contemporary cognitive neuroscientists who
tend to assume that all neural mechanisms relevant to understanding cog-
nition and consciousness are classically describable, Bohm follows Bohr
and looks for a significant role for quantum processes in neural function-
ing (p. 171):
In addition to such classically describable mechanism that seems
to act like a general system of communications, Bohr’s suggestion
involves the idea that certain key points controlling this mechanism
(which are, in turn, affected by the actions of this mechanism) are
so sensitive and delicately balanced that they must be described
in an essentially quantum-mechanical way. (We might, for exam-
ple, imagine that such key points exist at certain types of nerve
junctions.) It cannot be stated too strongly that we are now on
exceedingly speculative grounds.
There are by now a number of different and much more detailed sug-
gestions about where such “quantum sites” could be located in the brain
(see, e.g., Hameroff and Penrose 2014 or, for review, Atmanspacher 2011).
What is important in Bohm’s suggestion, however, is the general scheme.
We are to envision two different levels of physical activity in the brain, one
of them classically describable, while the other one needs to be described
in a quantum theoretical way. This leads naturally to the assumption that
the physical correlate of the logical thinking process is at the classically
describable level of the brain, while the basic thinking process is at the
quantum-theoretically describable level. Since Bohm implies that there is
a two-way traffic between these two levels, a typical state of mind includes
both of them.
It is also interesting to speculate that different types of states of mind
could correspond to physiological states that differ with respect to the rel-
ative contribution made by “classical” and “quantum” neural processes.
In some altered states of consciousness, for example, the classically de-
scribable neural processes might make a relatively small contribution to
the content of experience, and as a result the holistic features typical of
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the quantum-theoretically describable neural processes would dominate.4
Although Bohm acknowledges that such ideas are speculative, he thinks
that they are worthy of being pursued further (p. 171):
Bohr’s hypothesis is not, however, in disagreement with anything
that is now known. And the remarkable point-by-point analogy be-
tween the thought processes and quantum processes would suggest
that a hypothesis relating these two may well turn out to be fruit-
ful. If such a hypothesis could ever be verified, it would explain in
a natural way a great many features of our thinking.
However, in the end we use the thinking process to explain the thinking
process, so there is an intrinsic circularity to begin with. But the sort of
thinking process that we commonly use in science is the logical thinking
process. Thus, the logical thinking process tries to describe the most
general thinking process. The logical thinking process is most suitable
for describing the “classical limit” – be it the classical physical domain or
the logical aspect of the thinking process. It is more difficult to describe
quantum processes with the help of the logical thinking process – just as
it is difficult to describe the general thinking process with it.
But we have already a fair amount of experience of dealing with quan-
tum processes, both mathematically and conceptually. Now, if the general
thinking process is analogous to quantum processes, we could make use of
our experience with the quantum domain to try and explain the general
thinking process. As an example, we saw above how Bohm characterized
the production of new ideas as being analogous to a quantum jump.
Bohm also considers the alternative that the general thinking process
does not literally involve quantum processes (p. 171):
Even if this hypothesis should be wrong, and even if we could de-
scribe the brains functions in terms of classical theory alone, the
analogy between thought and quantum processes would still have
important consequences: we would have what amounts to a classi-
cal system that provides a good analogy to quantum theory. At the
least, this would be very instructive. It might, for example, give us
a means for describing effects like those of the quantum theory in
terms of hidden variables. (It would not, however, prove that such
hidden variables exist).
Suppose that the general thought process is classically describable, and
suppose that it is closely analogous to quantum processes. This opens
4The way I have here elaborated Bohm’s early “quantum mind” ideas may seem
very reductionist, as it is easy to interpret them as implying that thought processes
can be reduced to a combination of classical and quantum processes in the brain. This
may be how Bohm himself thought of the matter at the time. However, it is well
known that his later overall mind-matter theory was not reductionist at all but rather
a version of aspect monism (see Bohm 1980, 1990; Pylkka¨nen 2007).
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up the possibility that quantum processes might, after all, be classically
describable; or at least it might be possible to describe them more fully
than what standard quantum theory allows.5
2.5 Understanding Quantum Theory
from Understanding Thinking
Another reason why Bohm thinks the analogy could be helpful, even
in the absence of experimental data, is that it can give us a better feeling
for quantum theory (p. 171):
For instance, suppose that we ask for a detailed description of how
an electron is moving in a hydrogen atom when it is in a definite
energy level. We can say that this is analogous to asking for a
detailed description of what we are thinking about while we are
reflecting on some definite subject. As soon as we begin to give
this detailed description, we are no longer thinking about the sub-
ject in question, but are instead thinking about giving a detailed
description. In a similar way, when the electron is moving with a
definable trajectory, it simply can no longer be an electron that has
a definite energy.
Here Bohm suggests to use the analogy between quantum processes and
thought process as a tool that helps us to understand quantum theory.
The kind of example he gives (asking someone to describe what they think)
is, in principle, easily understandable to all of us. If such familiar features
of the thought process are analogous to quantum processes, this makes
it easier for us to understand quantum processes. Given that quantum
theory is notoriously difficult to understand, this underlines the usefulness
of the analogy.
But suppose that the thought process literally involves quantum pro-
cesses. This would open up the possibility of yet another way for us to
understand quantum processes (pp. 171–172):
If it should be true that the thought processes depend critically on
quantum-mechanical elements in the brain, then we could say that
the thought processes provide the same kind of direct experience
of the effects of quantum theory that muscular forces provide for
classical theory. Thus, for example, the pre-Galilean concepts of
force, obtained from immediate experience with muscular forces,
were correct, in general. ... We suggest that, similarly, the behavior
5I considered the above quote (which contains the reference to hidden variables) in
a talk I gave at the University of Freiburg (at the interdisciplinary colloquium Visions
in Research, April 23, 2014). In the discussion Harald Atmanspacher usefully pointed
out that Bohm here refers to local hidden variables. These – unlike Bohm’s own 1952
non-local hidden variable approach – have been ruled out by experiments like those of
Aspect et al. (1982).
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of our thought process may perhaps reflect in an indirect way some
of the quantum-mechanical aspects of the matter of which we are
composed.
This is an extremely interesting possibility. Remember that quantum ef-
fects are often thought to lie in a domain that is not at all accessible
to us in ordinary experience. As a consequence, it is assumed that we
should not be surprised that it is difficult for us to understand the quan-
tum domain – after all, we have no experience of it prior to the scientific
experiments that probe this domain. Bohm suggests to turn this familiar
scheme upside down. For it might be the case that all of us are, after
all, familiar with some quantum-mechanical aspects of matter, in virtue
of being familiar with an important part of ourselves, namely our thought
processes! Quantum effects, which were supposed to lie in some myste-
rious domain that only physicists have access to, may lie much closer to
home than we thought. If we are, psychologically, quantum-theoretical
beings, then by being familiar with ourselves we may be familiar with
quantum effects.
In philosophy, we sometimes speak about “maker’s knowledge”, imply-
ing that someone who has made or constructed something has a special
kind of knowledge about it which others may lack. In a similar vein we
might speak about “be-er’s knowledge” – the knowledge someone has in
virtue of being a certain kind of system (so I do not here mean to im-
ply that a barley drink has knowledge!).6 Thought is an essential part
of our being, and if thought processes reflect in an indirect way some of
the quantum aspects of the matter of which we are composed, we might
in principle have or be able to obtain “be-er’s knowledge” of quantum
aspects of matter.
The idea of “be-er’s knowledge” figures prominently in philosophical
discussions about conscious experience. For example, Nagel (1974) fa-
mously argued that there is something it is like to be a bat; and that
we cannot find out what it is like just by studying the bat’s brain and
behavior. Only the “be-er” has direct experience of what it is like to be
that system. In the case of the bat, it cannot communicate what it is like
to be a bat in terms of concepts and logical thought to us.
For Nagel the example of the bat underlines the subjective, perspective-
bound nature of consciousness. But even in the case of humans, it is not
at all clear that we can communicate in any exhaustive sense in terms of
concepts and logical arguments about what it is like to be a human being.
The problem is not merely that a description of the objective, physiolog-
ical correlates of conscious experience does not necessarily capture what
it is like to be that system. There may be a part of our being that simply
6The physicist John Bell coined the term “beable” in this sense when in search for
an ontological counterpart to the term “observable” in quantum theory.
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is so holistic, unpredictable etc. that it is difficult to capture in terms of
conceptual and logical thought.
We can rephrase Bohm’s suggestion by saying that part of what it is
like to be a thinking human being is to have direct experience of the effects
of quantum theory. Of course, this is not to say that we all thereby have
conceptually organized knowledge about the effects of quantum theory.
Bohm argues that the general thinking process is holistic and uncontrol-
lable by its nature, and thus difficult to describe in terms of our usual sci-
entific language that is organized in terms of separate concepts and logical
arguments. Insofar as we are all familiar with the quantum-like general
thinking process, our familiarity, acquaintance or understanding may be
“pre-conceptual” and “pre-logical”.7 We can, of course, try to improve
this “pre-conceptual” familiarity or acquaintance and try to develop new
concepts and principles to capture the holistic and uncontrollable aspects
of our thought processes. We will return to the issue of pre-conceptual
experience in Sec. 4.
In summary, we have seen how Bohm’s analogies emphasize that the
process of thought can be easily disturbed by introspective observation;
that there is a limit in the extent to which significance of elements of
thoughts can be analyzed; and that besides this generally incontrollable,
unpredictable and indivisible character, the mind also has a domain of
separable concepts which can be connected causally, following the rules
of logic. Bohm further suggested that the analogies would get a natural
explanation if it turned out that the neural processes that realize thought
processes in the brain would involve quantum processes.
I hope that my extended presentation and discussion of Bohm’s analo-
gies has given the reader an example of what can be meant by the idea
that was raised in the introduction of this paper: A new paradigm can,
by analogy, function to draw attention to new aspects of the mind in
introspection. The fairly new idea contained in these analogies is the sug-
gestion that our general thinking process is quantum-like, whether or not
this is a mere coincidence or the result of underlying quantum-physical
correlates of thought.8 Although my discussion is admittedly sketchy and
speculative, one should realize that the scientific and philosophical impli-
cations of this line of thought are potentially very significant. There is a
possibility of a revolution in our understanding of the mind that might
parallel the significance of the quantum revolution in physics.
7Compare Pylkko¨ (1998), and compare also the discussion of non-conceptual content
(Bermu´dez and Cahen 2011, Feil and Atmanspacher 2010). It might also be useful
to consider the relation of the above to Russell’s idea of knowledge by acquaintance
(Russell 1912).
8It is interesting to consider to what extent Bohm’s 1951 discussion anticipates
the current significant advances in quantum cognition. One thinks here, for example,
about Bruza et al.’s (2009) idea of a quantum-like human mental lexicon, or Aerts’s
(2009) notions of quantum-like concepts and the two modes of human thought.
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Let us now move on to briefly compare Bohm’s approach with some
other descriptions of inner experience and thought in contemporary phi-
losophy of mind and cognitive science.9
3. Cognitive Science and Quantum Analogies
Traditional cognitive science was for a long time dominated by the
so-called symbolic paradigm in which cognition was assumed to be me-
chanical symbol manipulation according to a set of rules or a “program”.
This resembles the domain of separable concepts in Bohm’s description.
Within cognitive science the symbolic paradigm was subjected to heavy
criticisms, and as is well known, connectionist modeling was offered as an
alternative way to describe cognition.10 Yet the advocates of the sym-
bolic paradigm, most notably Fodor and Pylyshyn (1988), argued that
connectionism lacks certain important features of the symbolic paradigm.
As an interesting attempt to reconcile the tension between connec-
tionism and the symbolic paradigm, Smolensky (1988) proposed that the
relation between them is analogous to the relation between quantum the-
ory and classical mechanics. The idea is that a theory typically works in
its proper domain, and that often a more general theory that applies in a
broader domain can give rise to another theory that applies in a narrower
domain as a limiting case. According to Smolensky’s proposal we ought to
view connectionism as the more general theory, describing a subsymbolic
level of the mind, while the symbolic paradigm can be seen as a special,
limiting case, describing those aspects of the mind where rule following
and symbol manipulation seem to take place.
9One should not forget relations to psychology. In an insightful paper on introspec-
tion, Marcel (2003) makes some points similar to this paper, and develops them in
more detail. Consider, for example, the following: “Attention can influence its object.
Attending to one’s experience, introspecting, changes the content, nature and form of
the experience. It is also widely accepted that the content, nature and form of the ex-
perience that constitutes the content of awareness depends on the way that we attend”
(Marcel 2003, p. 179). Marcel further provides an interesting discussion of the way (a)
attention can be directed to components or to a whole; (b) how one’s stance toward
the object of attention can vary between immersion and detachment; (c) how attention
can create its object; (d) how awareness distorts its object; and (e) how our theories
can mask our experience. I think the way Marcel’s ideas stand out as radical ideas is
an indication that the sorts of features of the mind that Bohm’s analogies raise are not
that commonly noticed and acknowledged in contemporary psychology. For example,
Marcel (2003, p. 179) writes: “John Lambie and I (2002) have recently emphasized
what we call the mode of attention, the manner in which one attends at any time –
an aspect of attention stressed by William James (1890) but largely ignored by most
current psychology.”
10In recent years dynamical modeling of cognition has become important and can
thus be seen as a third approach alongside symbolicism and connectionism. For an
interesting recent discussion of these approaches see Eliasmith (2003).
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Smolensky’s analogy is in some ways similar to Bohm’s analogy. Both
recognize that the mind has a “classical limit”, as it were, a domain we can
describe in terms of separable symbols, related in definite ways. And both
agree that another, more general description is required to give a fuller
description of the mind, and that the relation between the two descriptions
is analogous to the relation between quantum theory and classical physics.
However, there are also differences between the two analogies. A par-
ticularly important difference is that Bohm’s analogy suggests that cogni-
tion is more radically holistic, unpredictable and uncontrollable than what
Smolensky’s approach implies. The reason for this is that Bohm proposes
a close analogy between quantum processes and processes of thought di-
rectly, whereas Smolensky makes a more methodological analogy between
the relation of quantum and classical physics on the one hand, and of
connectionism and the symbolic paradigm on the other.
Smolensky proposes that important, general features of cognition can
be captured by connectionist networks. Connectionist networks have some
holistic properties, and the mathematical formalism of connectionism has
similarities to the mathematical formalism of quantum theory (see Perus
1995). However, it has been emphasized that traditional connectionist
models do not go beyond the symbolic paradigm when it comes to me-
chanical computability. Pylkko¨ (1998, p. 94), for example, has suggested
that “... most probably, all existing artificial neural networks and artificial
models of chaotic systems are Turing-computable and, therefore, mechan-
ical, in the obvious sense of the word”. Thus the idea that cognition
can be described in terms of connectionist models is not as different from
the ideas of the symbolic paradigm as the proponents of connectionism,
including Smolensky, seem to assume.
In contrast, Bohm’s claim that our inner experiences and thought
processes are closely analogous to quantum processes constitutes a much
more radical break from the symbolic paradigm. It implies that mental
processes have radically uncontrollable, indeterministic and semantically
holistic features which cannot be adequately modelled by either the sym-
bolic or the connectionist paradigms insofar as these are embedded in the
framework of classical physics. Bohm’s use of quantum analogies thus led
him already in 1951 to propose an outline of a much more radical view of
the mind than what cognitive science, inspired by the mechanistic com-
putational models of the symbolic and connectionist type, came up with
during the 1980s.
Now, the fact that Bohm’s view of the mind is more radically holis-
tic than that of either symbolic or connectionist cognitive science does
not mean that it is correct. But how can we decide which view is cor-
rect? Perhaps we ought to listen to what the introspectionists and the
phenomenologists have to say about the mind, then combine this with
relevant computational models and empirical research in cognitive neu-
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roscience and then make our judgement. But this brings us back to our
starting point. If introspection, including the introspection used in phe-
nomenology, is theory-laden, this entails a tendency that introspection or
phenomenology will, in a self-serving way, produce evidence to the view of
the mind that the practitioner of introspection already had – consciously
or unconsciously – before the introspection. For example, Pylkko¨ (1998,
p. 80) writes:
... classical phenomenology (say, as it is developed in Husserl’s
Ideen 1913/1976) is not free of the intellectualist bias of the scientific-
technological attitude because classical phenomenology clearly sides
with the conscious subject and its allegedly autonomous rational-
ity and quite openly acknowledges the rational subject’s right to
dominate the rest of the mind.
In particular, introspectionists and phenomenologists not familiar with
quantum physics are unlikely to suggest that the kind of unpredictability,
uncontrollability and indivisibility they may encounter in introspection
has the radical, non-classical character of quantum processes, simply be-
cause they are likely to lack the conceptual tools required to recognize
such features, and to evaluate their difference from more classical-type
features. Of course, all this does not prove that mind has quantum-like
aspects. Perhaps an introspecter equipped with a quantum paradigm,
such as Bohm, will be likewise biased in their introspection so that they
attribute quantum-like behavior to aspects of mind that do not really call
for it.
Nevertheless, it is at least in principle possible that, say, a quantum
paradigm will provide a more adequate characterization of the mind than
a mechanistic paradigm. In other words, human inner experience and
mental processes may have certain features which are not completely de-
termined by the mechanistic paradigm, and which different paradigms
manage to deal with in varying degree of success. What any paradigm
does is then to focus our attention in a particular way – so that we “see”
certain aspects of what is “there” (in some sense “given”) in experience.
We know we have been warned about the dangers of the myth of the
given, most notably by Sellars (1956). But doing philosophy or science
without the possibility of there being anything given in experience may
also turn out to be a futile enterprise (cf. Westerlund 2014). I suggest for
phenomenology it is better to have a classical plus quantum paradigm,
instead of just a classical one. This way one may be able to “see” more
of the conscious experience and thought processes – especially their un-
predictable and holistic features, the sorts of features that are difficult to
conceptualize. And the idea is that a richer and more inclusive paradigm
can reveal further features. I do not claim that this suggestion is unprob-
lematic, but I will not attempt to argue for it here.
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One might also note here that the connection between physics and the
nature of human experience is an interesting theme in the history of phi-
losophy. Most notably, Kant assumed that human experience necessarily
has to exhibit certain features of Newtonian physics, such as spatiality,
temporality and causality (see Kant 1787/1991, Strawson 1966). With
his analogies Bohm draws attention to the non-Newtonian features of hu-
man experience, and in this sense he broadens the Kantian notion of what
kinds of human experience are conceivable and possible. Kant was not
wrong in claiming that human experience has Newtonian features, but he
was perhaps wrong in his estimation of the limits within which human
experience can vary.
Today, armed with the resources of post-Newtonian physics, we are in
a position to see new analogies between physics and human experience.
Consequently, we are encouraged to articulate our view of the limits within
which human experience can vary in a new, broader way. Post-Newtonian
physics inspires a post-Kantian view of human experience.
4. Post-Phenomenology and Quantum Analogies
Bohm is clearly not alone in suggesting that human inner experience,
especially conscious thought has unpredictable, uncontrollable, indivisi-
ble and non-logical features. In particular, the philosophical movement
some call “post-phenomenology” emphasizes such features. The connec-
tion between post-phenomenological ideas and quantum physics has been
noticed and emphasized by, e.g., Plotnitsky (1994, 2002), Pylkko¨ (1998)
and Globus (1995, 2003), who also emphasizes the role of quantum brain
dynamics developed by Jibu and Yasue (1995), as well as Vitiello (2001). I
have found Pylkko¨’s views particularly helpful when trying to make sense
of Bohm’s 1951 analogies to cognitive science and philosophy of mind.
Pylkko¨ developed a radical philosophical view that differs in some im-
portant ways from Bohm’s philosophy of nature. In particular, Pylkko¨
advocates an antirealist view, in which one does not assume physical real-
ity to exist in a well-defined way independently of human experience. Of
primary significance for him is aconceptual experience, without any sharp
division between concepts and objects. How do concepts and objects
emerge then?
Pylkko¨’s idea is that they arise simultaneously as aconceptual experi-
ence divides itself into two aspects, concepts and the corresponding ob-
jects. However, he does not give too strong an ontological status for
either the objects or the concepts. In contrast, Bohm had a tendency to
defend a realist viewpoint in his natural philosophy, although his realism
got increasingly modified, weakened and problematized as he kept on de-
veloping the epistemic implications of his holistic and processual view of
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nature (see Bohm 1980, Chap. 3). Here is a more detailed characterization
of aconceptual experience given by Pylkko¨ (1998, p. 13) himself:
Let us take immediate and unstructured primitive experience as
our philosophical starting point. This unarticulated and prelogical
experience which we call aconceptual is what mind and language
primarily is. It is not yet organized by concepts. Because we as-
sociate subjectivity strongly with the conceptual organization of
experience we say also that, in aconceptual experience, there is
no such hierarchy and perspective which characterize the subject’s
presence. The experience is, so to speak, holistically everywhere,
without center, or it has a center which is not yet fully organized.
Viewed from the perspective of Pylkko¨’s post-phenomenology, Bohm’s
1951 analogies clearly draw attention to some important aspects of the
“aconceptual mind”. For as we saw above, according to Bohm the general
thinking process is non-logical, uncontrollable, unpredictable, and its se-
mantic elements are indivisible in a way that makes it difficult to analyze
it in conceptual terms. It seems to me that this fits fairly well with the
view of the mind a post-phenomenologist like Pylkko¨ advocates, as long
as one bears in mind the difference between, say, Pylkko¨ and Bohm on
the issue of realism. No doubt Pylkko¨’s view of the mind differs also in
other important respects from that of Bohm, but I think it is fair to say
that the use of quantum analogies helped Bohm to capture some impor-
tant and neglected features of the mind, which are today described by
post-phenomenology in a more sophisticated and elaborate way.
5. Concluding Reflections
A central theme of this paper is the following: If introspection is
paradigm-laden and if quantum physics gives rise to a new paradigm,
might then someone armed with this new paradigm see new features in
introspection, and thus have new things to tell us about conscious expe-
rience and the mind more generally?
As an example, I considered some analogies which Bohm already in
1951 proposed to hold between quantum processes and inner experiences,
especially thought processes. These analogies draw attention to certain
quantum-like features of the most general type of thought process, such as
uncontrollability, unpredictability, semantic indivisibility, inseparability,
non-logicality and non-conceptuality, while also doing justice to the more
“classical” features of the thought process such as semantic separability,
conceptuality, logicality and causality. The analogies acknowledge that
these classical features are indispensable in many ways, but they also
underline the fundamentality of the quantum-like aspect, for example, for
the production of new ideas.
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We have seen that Bohm’s analogies are in some important respects
similar to Smolensky’s analogy that tries to reconcile symbolic and con-
nectionist paradigms in cognitive science. But we have also emphasized
that Bohm’s view of the mind, guided by his quantum intuitions, is more
radically holistic than that of Smolensky’s hybrid cognitive science. We
also pointed out that it is difficult to judge which view is correct. If intro-
spection is indeed paradigm-laden, whose paradigm are we going to use
when introspecting in order to decide which paradigm is correct? The
possible paradigm-ladeness of introspection gives rise to a circularity that
ought to make us careful in our judgements regarding the nature of human
experience. Considering a somewhat similar problem in the context of
Heidegger’s account of the problem of phenomenality, Westerlund (2014,
p. 507) makes the following reasonable proposal:
... we need to take seriously the fact that a phenomenological de-
scription can only arise and justify itself as a description of a partic-
ular kind of experience, whereby the scope and clarificatory force of
the description is always bound to remain open and undetermined.
My suggestion is that it is worth further considering the idea that
human inner experience, and the general type of thought process in par-
ticular, has some quantum-like features. This opens up the possibility
of a less mechanical and in my view more accurate description of hu-
man experience than what, say, cognitive science currently offers. I also
related the view of the mind implicit in Bohm’s analogies to Pylkko¨’s
post-phenomenological view of the mind as aconceptual experience, and
saw a fairly good fit between some aspects of these views.
What lessons can we draw from our brief study? I think the above
discussion provides tentative evidence that quantum physical intuitions
can in fact help to introspect human experience in a new, productive
way. Introspection seems to be theory-laden, but this need not be seen
merely as an epistemic limitation. It should by now be clear that such
theory-ladeness requires us to become much more cautious when making
statements about the “nature of the mind”. But it seems to be at least a
reasonable possibility that new theories can help us to see the phenomena
we are exploring in a new light. And a theory originally developed to deal
with a particular domain may prove useful in a prima facie very different
domain – prima facie, because there are currently a number of different
hypotheses proposing that in one relevant way or the other, the physical
correlates of mental processes literally involve quantum processes. If this
is correct, it would make it less of a puzzle how quantum theory may turn
out to be relevant to describing the mind. In other words, two prima facie
very different domains may turn out to be partly the same.
I recognize that it sounds somewhat far-fetched to many scientists
that the study of physics could help us to understand the mind. But note
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that such a possibility is implicit in the whole program of philosophical
atomism that underlies many of the successes of modern science. The
traditional idea has been that physics studies the simple constituents of
nature and the regularities in their behavior. This understanding of the
behavior at the micro-level may then help us to understand features of
more complex, higher-level systems. With quantum physics, however, the
whole scheme of philosophical atomism is challenged, and one is forced
to consider some radically holistic basic principles. Bohm refers to those
principles when he suggests analogies between quantum processes and the
mind. But surely, if the mind has such holistic features, it has had them
all along, so does it really take quantum physics to notice and theorize
about them?
The mechanistic view of the mind that dominates contemporary cogni-
tive science and philosophy of mind – which is basically still nothing more
than a hypothesis – has got part of its legitimacy and plausibility from
the successes of the mechanistic view in physics and biology. In a similar
vein, a radically holistic physics raises the possibility of a holistic biology
and a holistic psychology (cf. Gierer 2002). Bohm’s analogies suggest that
just as the physical world has two aspects – the general holistic “quantum
world”, and as a special case, the mechanistic “classical world”, so the hu-
man mind has two analogous aspects, the holistic general thinking process
and the more mechanical, logical thinking process. Quantum physics can
play an important role for psychology in suggesting a simple prototype of
how a general holistic level and a special case of a mechanistic level can be
reconciled. Thus, although the holistic aspects of the mind can no doubt
be discovered without quantum physics (and indeed have been), I suggest
that the quantum analogies can enrich both our introspective experience
of the mind and the theories we construct in psychology and cognitive
science.
Bohm’s 1951 analogies are only a limited illustration of the way quan-
tum physics can be useful when trying to understand the mind. For one
thing, Bohm himself went on to interpret quantum physics in different
ways and, not surprisingly, invented new analogies between interpreta-
tions of quantum physics and the mind. For example, Bohm and Hiley’s
“ontological interpretation” of quantum theory suggests that electrons are
guided by a new type of field containing “active information” (Bohm and
Hiley 1993). Bohm further suggested that the way such information acts
is analogous to the way information acts in subjective human experience
(see Bohm 1990, Pylkka¨nen 1992, 2007, Hiley and Pylkka¨nen 2005, Hiley
2004). His idea was that such active information could help us to under-
stand what the mental and the physical sides of reality are and how they
can affect each other. In this way, quantum theory can be used to tackle
both the mind-body problem in general and the more specific problem of
mental causation.
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In the context of his “implicate order” framework, Bohm (1980) like-
wise discussed the relation of mind and matter in a new way. The idea here
is that mind and matter are analogous to non-locally connected quantum
systems. They ought to be seen as correlated projections from a common
multi-dimensional ground, rather than as separate substances in causal in-
teraction. This is a radically new version of aspect monism, which again
makes use of the resources of quantum theory.
It is important to note that Bohm’s analogies differ from each other
in important ways, although they have in common that they all originate
from quantum physics (cf. Guarini 2003). This means that it is not a
trivial task to construct a unified view of mind and matter on the basis of
his analogies between quantum physics and the mind. For example, while
the ontological interpretation (with its continuous particle trajectories)
fits well with dynamical systems theory, the implicate order scheme chal-
lenges the latter. For the implicate order scheme underlines the disconti-
nuity of movement and suggests that the basic mathematical structures
needed to describe movement are algebras rather than differential calculus
(Bohm 1980, Chap. 6; Pylkka¨nen 2007, pp. 117–122).
My suggestion is that the different Bohmian schemes, when applied to
cognition and consciousness, can be seen as different tools which each can
provide a useful way of looking at some aspect of the mind (cf. Murphy
1998). The implicate order scheme, I suggest ought to be seen as the
more general and fundamental tool, but this need not exclude the use of
the ontological interpretation scheme, as long as one remembers that the
latter provides a more limited view. Whether or not these tools, and other
similar tools developed by other researchers, help us to construct a more
satisfactory theory of mind is currently an open question. But I hope
that this study, which has focused on some of Bohm’s very early ideas,
illustrates some ways in which the consideration of quantum physics when
studying the mind can be fruitful and open up radically new possibilities.
Perhaps some ideas discussed in this paper can also be useful when
evaluating the relevance of quantum brain dynamics to the humanities,
something that Globus (1995, 2003) in particular has emphasized. For
example, Vitiello’s (2001) focus on the “double” structure of the mind
has been inspired by his consideration of dissipative quantum field theory.
This, I think, constitutes yet another example of how quantum analogies
can guide us in our search for a new and potentially richer view of the
mind.
Notice that Vitiello’s approach builds upon a more sophisticated scheme
than quantum mechanics, namely quantum field theory. Applied to bio-
logical systems, this opens up the possibility of developing a more empir-
ically accurate description of the physical aspects of the brain (Freeman
and Vitiello 2006). At the same time, quantum field theory is often felt
to be more difficult to understand than quantum mechanics. As a con-
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sequence, it can be more difficult to understand the analogies one might
draw between quantum field theory and mental processes. I hope that the
above consideration of some more simple analogies between thought pro-
cesses and quantum processes can be helpful for a better understanding
of the fascinating but difficult synthesis of quantum field theory, biology,
neuroscience and (continental) philosophy of mind that is emerging from
the work of Vitiello, Globus and others.
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